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HYMAN v. ALKEN
824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987)
FACTS
William Hyman was one of a group of people who, while
intoxicated, was involved in an armed robbery which resulted in
a death. The triggerman was never identified, and everyone ex-
cept Hyman and his wife accepted plea bargains. Hyman was
charged with murder and pled not guilty.
Hyman was found guilty and sentenced to death in South
Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. State v.
Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. denied,
Hyman v. Aiken, 606 F.Supp. 1046 (D.S.C. 1985); however, the
court of appeals overturned and granted resentencing. Hyman
v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938 (4th Cir. 1985 ).
On petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
case was remanded for consideration in light of Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, (1986) (holding that a jury instruction which
creates an unconstitutional presumption of malice should be
scrutinized under a harmless error test) and Cabana v. Bullock,
474 U.S. 376 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires that whether a participant in a robbery during which a
murder is committed killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill may be decided by the trial judge, or an appellate court, as
well as a jury). Aiken v. Hyman, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
The court of appeals on remand reversed the judgment of
the district court and remanded with instructions to grant a writ
of habeas corpus. Judges Russell, Widener and Butzner concur-
red that Hyman was entitled to a new trial on the merits;
however, Senior Circuit Judge Butzner went on to review the
punishment phase of the trial.
HOLDING
a) Erroneous malice instructions.
The trial judge instructed the jury that malice is presumed
from the intentional doing of an unlawful act or use of a dead-
ly weapon, that the presumption of malice could be rebutted,
and that the State must prove malice beyond a reasonable
doubt. 824 F.2d at 1409.
Senior Circuit Judge Butzner, joined by Judges Russell and
Widener, found that "[ulnder the trial court's presumed malice
charges, the jury may reasonably have believed it should convict
Hyman even if it were not convinced that he acted with intent
to commit murder." Id., at 1410. The court found import in
the malice instructions in the state's reliance on them in closing
arguments. Id., at 1410. Confusion over the malice instructions
may also have led the jury to believe that it should convict
Hyman even if it was not convinced that he was capable of ac-
ting with intent to commit murder in his intoxicated state. Id.,
at 1409-10. The court found that the instructions may have led
the jury to believe that the state is relieved of its affirmative
burden to prove malice. Id., at 1409.
b) Rose's harmless error test.
The court reviewed the question based on Rose's harmless
error test. "In deciding whether an erroneous malice instruction
was harmless error, Rose requires an examination of the record
as a whole to determine whether the evidence of intent is so
dispositive that the 'reviewing court can say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary
to rely on the presumption' .. ." 824 F.2d at 1409.
Senior Circuit Judge Butzner set forth his separate views and
additional comments, also discussing the Enmund/Cabana ques-
tion relative to sentencing. Judge Butzner discussed" . . . the
Court's opinion in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) ... [which] held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on a partici-
pant in a robbery during which a murder is committed unless
the participant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill..."
824 F.2d at 1410. Judge Butzner found that "the charge to the
jury and the jury's verdict do not satisfy Enmund's re-
quirements for the imposition of the death sentence." Id., at
1410-11. Judge Butzner rejected the South Carolina Supreme
Court's finding that the jury either explicitly or implicity found
that Hyman killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, and
refused to make such a finding itself, noting Cabana's caution
"that when the question ... involves an issue of credibility that
cannot be determined accurately on a paper record, there might
be no adequate basis for appellate fact finding." Id., at 1411.
c) Ineffective assistance of counsel.
Senior Circuit Judge Butzner also dealt with the claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel. He began by noting the law in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which required
evaluation pursuant to a two-part test: First, that "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness," with the presumption that counsel's perfor-
mance was actually part of a sound trial strategy and within the
limits of reasonable professional standards. Id., at 688-689. Se-
cond, if the first prong is met, that "there is a reasonable pro-
bability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." Id., at 694.
Hyman's counsel, Demetrious Stratos, had not read current
Supreme Court or South Carolina court decisions about capital
punishment. Stratos met with his client only twice during the
trial proceedings. Stratos did not make use of the prosecutor's
files, which were open to him and contained, among other
things, police statements made by Hyman which were later used
to impeach Hyman. Stratos did not do anything to prepare for
the sentencing phase. Stratos did not read the South Carolina
death penalty statute, which lists aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, before commencement of the sentencing
proceedings.
Justice Butzner found that the presumption in favor of
counsel "does not overcome the failure of Hyman's attorneys
to do basic legal research, to review the testimony of key
witnesses-including their own client-and to be familiar with
readily available documents necessary to an understanding of
their client's case. Counsel's lack of preparation and research
cannot be considered the result of deliberate, informed trial
strategy. Their performance was based on ignorance rather than
on understanding of the facts and the law. We conclude
counsel's performance to be below the objective standard or
reasonable representation required by Strickland." 824 F.2d at
1416.
Justice Butzner also concluded that "but for his counsel's
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the sentencing phase of Hyman's trial would have
been different." Id., at 1416. Noting the "greater need for ac-
curate fact finding" in a capital case, the court said "Because
Hyman's counsel was ineffective, the trial record is an inade-
quate basis for the imposition of the death penalty by the jury,
appellate, or post-conviction courts." Id., at 1416.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
This case is directly applicable to Virginia. Under the
capital trial section of the Virginia Model Jury Instructions on
Capital Trials there is no mention of malice at all. No. 34.100.
However, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions definition of
malice states:
Malice is that state of mind which results in
the intentional doing of a wrongful act to
another without legal excuse or justification,
at a time when the mind of the actor is under
the control of reason. Malice may result from
any unlawful or unjustifiable motive including
anger, hatred or revenge. Malice may be in-
ferred from any deliberate willful and cruel
act against another, however sudden. No.
34.220. (Emphasis added).
The Instructions continue with Inference of Malice:
You may infer malice from the deliberate use
of a deadly weapon unless, from all the
evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether malice existed... No. 34.240. (Em-
phasis added).
The Instructions also contain a definition of "willful, deliberate
and premeditated:"
... means a specific intent to kill, adopted
at some time before the killing, but which
need not exist for any particular length of
time ... No. 34.260.
These instructions appear to have the same problem as the
South Carolina instructions given at Hyman's trial. These in-
structions could be construed by a juror to shift the burden to
the defendant. Malice may be inferred and must, in effect, be
rebutted by the defendant, in direct violation of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
The confusion regarding sentence of death without the fin-
ding that the defendant was the triggerman will not occur in
Virginia because Virginia statutory construction permits imposi-
tion of the death penalty only for the triggerman, or actual
perpetrator of the homicide. Va. Code Ann., §18.2-31.
Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this
case is a good example of what not do do. Judge Butzner's
comments suggesting that basic legal research, review of
testimony of key witnesses, and familiarity with readily
available documents should be an absolute minimum standard
for all lawyers in capital cases. (Helen Bishop)
